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Highlights
The European Banking Union’s institutional structure, democratic legitimacy and 
future outlook were discussed at a conference organised by the European Uni-
versity Institute on the 22 May 2015. The conference brought together lawyers, 
economists and political scientists as well as EU practitioners to discuss the nature 
of the processes that gave rise to the banking union. Its aim was to retrace the de-
cision-making process leading to the Banking Union and to address the trade-off 
between efficient problem solving, on the one hand, and democratic legitimation 
on the other. Given the emergence of new conflict lines among and within Eu-
ropean Member States (creditors/debtors; pro-centralization/anti-centralization; 
banks/tax-payers), another central intellectual concern was to understand how 
the adopted institutional arrangements reflected these frictions, and how they are 
likely to influence the functioning of the Banking Union in the future.
The Banking Union represents a substantial set of new competencies for the Eu-
ropean Union. Building on the diversity of participants’ disciplinary backgrounds, 
the conference hence discussed some of the legal and political issues this delega-
tion of competencies raises. One was the extent to which the Banking Union looks 
similar or different to the way EU competences in competition policy have devel-
oped and more generally to the regulation of the single market. There were broad 
concerns about the accountability of the current institutional arrangements, and 
indeed a lively debate about what the demands of democratic legitimacy entail 
and how accountability mechanisms could be designed in the case of the Banking 
Union. Whether the future of the Banking Union involves continued muddling 
through, or whether it will eventually require a strong fiscal capacity and thus 
treaty change, was a lively topic of discussion.
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Background 
In 2012, at the height of the sovereign debt crisis, European 
decision makers decided that the next step in developing an 
ever closer union involved the formation of a Banking Union 
(BU). One important goal of the reform was to break the dan-
gerous link between government debt and national banks 
buying government bonds to finance this debt. A Single Super-
visory Mechanism (SSM) and a Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM) followed suit in October 2013 and in June 2014, respec-
tively. The political decision-making that resulted in the two 
mechanisms involved difficult bargaining. Governments had 
diverging preferences, particularly with respect to the mutual 
insurance of bank deposits in case of bank failure, but also 
as regards the distribution of decision-making competences 
under both the SSM and the SRM. 
The Banking Union was also an attempt to balance the effec-
tiveness of technocratic governance with the necessity of estab-
lishing democratic oversight in a multinational polity. The SSM 
was introduced on the basis of a unanimity vote of Member 
States. It earned the support of the European Parliament only 
once the latter had been granted additional powers. In the case 
of the SRM, the decision-process significantly involves national 
decision-makers and limited burden sharing as the rescue 
fund is relatively small (55 billion euros) and will be built up 
over 8 years. The upshot of the modest SRM compromise is 
that the ECB is indirectly gaining more relevance, because it 
is under more pressure to ensure that banks can withstand 
another shock. Despite the advances made, the overall impres-
sion is hence that the EU does not yet dispose of a full-fledged 
banking union. 
1. Technocratic and Centralized Decision-
Making in Banking Union
The first panel focussed on the Banking Union’s technocratic 
and centralized decision-making. It retraced the key elements 
of the process that led to its establishment and discussed the 
BU’s implications from a democratic and constitutional per-
spective. 
Niamh Moloney (LSE) addressed the functional effectiveness 
of the overall BU architecture, based on recent evidence. She 
examined recent developments, including the recruitment of 
over 1000 staff members to the ECB/SSM, the establishment of 
a number of key systems and procedures (including the criti-
cally important Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process 
(SREP)), the important allocation of banks to direct supervi-
sion by the ECB, and the success of the Asset Quality Review, 
a major test for the ECB. Niamh Moloney underscored, how-
ever, that the jury is still out on the effectiveness or otherwise 
of the horizontal interaction between the institutional govern-
ance of BU and the EU’s wider financial governance system for 
the single market (i.e. the single rulebook and the European 
System of Financial Supervision, notably EBA) - she warned 
of the risks of this ‘fragile institutional ecosystem.’ She pointed 
in particular to the existence of both arbitrage opportunities 
and positive competition between the two governance orders 
for the SSM-zone and the single market.  But drawing on 
recent evidence as to the nature of EBA/ECB interaction she 
was reasonably confident as to the future success of the two 
sets of institutional structures and, in particular, as to the likely 
development of a productive ‘axis of technocracy’ between the 
ECB and EBA.
In his intervention, Hans Micklitz (EUI) considered the move 
from the internal market to the Banking Union (BU), i.e. from 
‘the technical, de-centralised Internal Market programme to 
the technocratic, financialised, centralized Banking Union’ 
and asked whether its advent constituted an evolution or a 
revolution. Using the regulation of the internal market as a 
standard reference, he suggested parameters of comparison 
(type of crisis induction, actor leading the process, means of 
implementation, ex ante/ex post nature and harmonisation 
technique, etc). He underscored that while the internal market 
relied mostly on harmonization and on decentralized mutual 
recognition to develop, the BU also includes central institu-
tion building. His assessment singled out a differing role for 
law in the two areas: while the single market is characterised by 
integration through law and governance, the banking union is 
so far moving towards enforcement without law. As if Europe 
were a laboratory, it is now in the search of some quasi-consti-
tutional mechanism to control its new banking union govern-
ance, Hans Micklitz added. 
2. A Second Step of Integration 
Through Constitutionalisation? From 
Competition to Banking Union
The second morning session considered the inherent consti-
tutional dimension of the project, comparing the emergence 
of a Banking Union to the EU constitution-building after the 
establishment of the competition order in the 1960s and 1970s.
Relying on a recently published report by a CEPS Task Force 
on Financial Markets and Institutions, Karel Lannoo (CEPS) 
characterised the Banking Union as ‘the biggest step forward in 
European integration that we have taken in years’. He addressed 
the current state of financial integration (as measured by 
cross-border holding of securities and cross-border action in 
inter-banking markets) and explained that a crucial challenge 
for the ECB will be to re-establish an integrated market in a 
context marked by re-nationalisation. As regards the effective-
3 ■ European Banking Union – Democracy, Technocracy and the State of Integration
ness of the SSM, he positively evaluated the first Comprehen-
sive Assessment/Stress Tests exercise jointly conducted with 
the European Banking Authority: it provided a credible health 
check of the soundness of Europe’s banking sector and so far 
the reaction of media and public at large proved positive. Mr 
Lannoo also pointed at the diversity of the banking sector in 
Europe (commercial, public and cooperative banks) as a super-
vision challenge and noted that as the ECB has to oversee some 
banks which are in the hands of governments, it will be con-
fronted with political problems sooner or later. 
Heike Schweitzer (Free University of Berlin) stressed that the 
Banking Union can be seen as an attempt to translate constitu-
tional norms and principles such as the integrity of the single 
currency, the internal market for banking services, competi-
tion and/or balanced economic growth into concrete rules 
(i.e. prudential rules; regime of supervision and enforcement). 
Despite some similarities in enforcement and governance, Mrs. 
Schweitzer argued that the parallel with competition policy 
should not be pushed too far. In truth, the Banking Union can 
be fundamentally narrowed down to a regulatory and manage-
rial approach. It resides in relatively low capital requirements, 
central supervision and strong discretionary powers of inter-
vention for the ECB. This method should be distinguished 
from a possible alternative „rule of law approach“ that would 
see high capital requirements, cleary-cut prudential rules and 
less, ad-hoc regulation and intervention. Overall, this second 
model may be more in line with European constitutional prin-
ciples and might yield better results in terms of competition, 
she concluded. 
Figure 1: Sergio Fabbrini| LUISS Rome 
Stefan Grundmann (EUI) discussed what role the Banking 
Union plays and might play in integration dynamics from posi-
tive and normative perspectives. He pointed out that the BU’s 
big step has been to shift administrative implementation to 
the central level – thus striving for much more uniformity in 
detail than could ever be possible under a system of prelimi-
nary reference only. He predicted that with the practices of the 
SSM and of the EBA (in implementing the single rule book), ‘a 
uniform and standardized administrative practice more gener-
ally for all banks in Europe will emerge’. He recalled that the 
question of the optimal level of centralization/decentraliza-
tion was treated in the literatures on federalism and regulatory 
competition. The findings thereof was that economies of scale, 
the risk of negative external effects, but also the homogeneity 
of the legal regime are seen as strong arguments for a deci-
sion making at the central level, while deeper information and 
better experimentation would speak in favour of decentraliza-
tion. Stefan Grundmann concluded by stating that one should 
go beyond the analysis of those advantages and disadvantages 
and strive to combine them in an intelligent order for regula-
tory competition.
3. Integration without democracy?
The two afternoon panels discussed the consequences of the 
BU for the overall institutional architecture of the EU, in par-
ticular as regards its democratic legitimation. 
Sergio Fabbrini (LUISS University) lined out the institutional 
structure and logic of the Banking Union. He emphasized that 
the real building blocks of the BU are the SSM and the SRM 
since a deposit guarantee scheme remains so far in the books. 
He argued that the SRM set-up was driven by a tension between 
inter-governmentalism and supranationalism, a clash of insti-
tutional logics which is particularly present in European inte-
gration since the Maastricht Treaty. Europe thus seems to be 
left with a new puzzle as integration proceeds in specific policy 
areas without that implying the traditional supra-nationaliza-
tion of those areas. This leads the analyst back to the original 
failed design of EMU: while there is a clear single authority in 
monetary terms, there is only a coordinated authority (at best) 
in economics terms. Mr. Fabbrini then turned to the crucial 
dilemma of accountability in the BU structure. He observed 
that the EU was acquiring growing executive powers in the 
financial area without there being credible checks in the system 
to make these powers accountable to the European Parliament 
and to national parliaments. In his view, the accountability 
challenge is reinforced by the absence of an institutionalized 
political responsibility in the EU polity.
Christoph Möllers (Humboldt University) looked at the 
democratic implications of the banking union. He lined out 
two conceptions of democracy: ‘democracy as political con-
testation’ and ‘democracy as rational deliberation’. He argued 
that what is problematic in the case of the EU, is the fact that 
the political process is full of distrust, including inside the 
European Central Bank. Talking about monetary dialogues, he 
deemed them only relevant if they would be linked to issues 
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in which the EP detains legislative or appointment powers. In 
other words, parliamentary accountability makes sense only 
if there can be a follow-up. This is why in his view, ‘account-
ability enables democratic legitimacy but cannot substitute it’. 
He concluded by underscoring a general tendency in the EU to 
satisfy the self-interest of all EU institutions to keep its polity 
legitimate, a trend confirmed by the structure of the Banking 
Union. Yet, if the granting of veto rights to everyone and the 
fostering of dialogues creates the appearance that all together 
the system is legitimate, there is ‘no necessary legitimate value 
in integrating all the actors’, Mr. Möllers suggested. 
Erik Jones (John’s Hopkins University) explained that ‘Euro-
peans have already created a financial system within which 
institutions and expectations exceed the scope of democratic 
accountability: that happened more than twenty-five years ago’. 
Europe’s political leaders thought they could ‘run those risks on 
the back of a democratic mandate’. Mr Jones thus underlined 
that democracies have put themselves into a situation that they 
cannot retreat from easily. No wonder then to see anti-austerity 
and welfare-chauvinist movements popping up in Europe. 
Their roots lie in the frustration that the pursuit of versatile 
financial market integration implies: ‘Northerners have to learn 
to accept lower rates of return; Southerners have to accept 
slower rates of growth and development’. Banking union, he 
argued, provides a convenient escape from this dilemma as it 
makes the challenges of financial integration more manageable 
by pooling resources and by stabilizing financial integration. 
What should be obvious, however, is that they will be winners 
and losers from financial market integration. Those mutual 
liabilities are reinforced by the ECB’s unconventional actions 
which bear distributional consequences.  If things go terribly 
wrong, there will be no banking union to talk about, he con-
cluded.
Johannes Lindner (ECB1) emphasized the degree of comple-
mentarity that the implementation of one of the unions laid 
down in the “Four Presidents Report” (banking union, fiscal 
union, economic union and political union) would imply, 
pointing at the existence of neo-functional spill-overs between 
them. Mr. Lindner argued that central banks achieve best 
their objectives if they are insulated from political pressure, 
because of the time inconsistency problem. Turning to the 
Banking Union governance, he explained that independence 
features among the key principles laid down by the Bank for 
International Settlement (BIS) for effective banking supervi-
sion. The sui generis institutional character of the EU and in 
particular its multi-level governance set a specific environment 
for the institutional design of the SSM. Describing account-
ability and independence as “two sides of the same coin”, Mr 
Lindner went through the accountability mechanisms for the 
1. Speaking in a personal capacity.
SSM pointing out also the elements where they go beyond the 
existing accountability arrangements for the ECB’s monetary 
policy function. Speculating about the future shape of EMU, 
he argued that there is an awareness among policy-makers that 
EMU is an unfinished business and that over the long term, 
progress in the other unions, including a fiscal capacity and a 
European Treasury, would probably emerge to further stabilize 
the euro area. 
After recalling the key role played by financial services in the 
UK and in the relationship between the UK and the EU, Angus 
Armstrong (National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research) explained that in his view, one shouldn’t lose sight 
of what has been achieved in past years. The discussion about 
financial stability and central banking goes straight to the core 
of UK debates where the task of banking supervision has been 
re-appropriated recently by the Bank of England. The question 
remains of the consistency with financial stability of two sets 
of regulations (ESFS and the Banking Union). This is prob-
lematic as ‘any lack of integrity (consistency, wholeness) of 
financial arrangements will be exploited by financial markets’. 
He expressed his doubts as to whether a bank resolution could 
really be conducted over a week-end and in secret, given the 
complex procedure set in the SRM. 
4. The Banking Union in 2020
The last panel asked how the political play of power in building 
the Banking Union is likely to influence its likely functioning 
and discussed potential dysfunctions of the banking union.
Martin Hellwig (Max Planck Institute for Research on Col-
lective Goods) insisted that Banking Union was necessary 
to avoid the ECB’s becoming a victim of weaknesses in the 
banking system that national authorities could not or would 
not address. Procrastination of national authorities was caused 
by an unwillingness to have problems come into the open, by 
connections between politics and banking, and finally, the 
desire to get indirect access to the printing press as ECB loans 
in support of weak banks were used to fund weak governments. 
Mr. Hellwig also pointed to serious open problems:  the legal 
basis is dubious, and European supervision and jurisdiction 
are in an awkward position when they have to apply national 
laws implementing the European directives.  Rules for cross-
border resolution were impractical, and there was a complete 
lack of provisions for liquidity in resolution. Resolution funds 
were much too small for that; these funds might be used for 
covering losses ex post, but not for ensuring interim funding 
on the order hundreds of billions of euros.   Finally, the lack of 
a fiscal backstop might become a problem in a systemic crisis in 
which losses exceed the capacity of resolutions funds, including 
further levies on the industry.  He concluded that the Banking 
5 ■ European Banking Union – Democracy, Technocracy and the State of Integration
Union will require more legislation, including a Treaty change, 
in the not too distant future.
Given the numerous institutional and political contingencies at 
play, Brigid Laffan (EUI) stressed the arduous task that it is to 
give an educated guess about the shape of the Banking Union 
in 2020. She provided a classification of possible types of Euro-
pean Unions along two dimensions: (1) more or less Europe; 
(2) more or less adaptation/transformation. Mrs. Laffan then 
addressed the two possible disintegration processes currently 
uncovering under our eyes: Grexit and Brexit. She observed 
that horizontal spill-overs from Tsipras to other leftist parties 
in Southern Europe seem to have stopped as many parties now 
tame down their rhetoric, perhaps due to the uncertainty of 
the Greek situation. While the Grexit prospects remain diffi-
cult to assess, she highlighted that the recent electoral landslide 
by David Cameron would yield better chances of convincing 
the British people to stay in the EU than the situation before. 
Mrs. Laffan argued that the overall system remains fragile and 
in need of further credibility, but that it is by far not as fragile 
as in 2011-2012 where policy-makers were deeply concerns 
about the contagion of the financial crisis. Looking ahead and 
paraphrasing Lindblom, Brigid Laffan explained that the ‘euro 
is still muddling but is not yet through’ and hypothesized that 
Europe would be locked in functional federalism for some time 
to come. 
Figure 2: Martin Hellwig | Max Plank Institute for Research on 
Collective Goods Bonn
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